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A Perspective on the Houston Economy
So far, recovery and
stronger growth in
Mexico seem to be
simply a matter of
waiting for U.S.
economic expansion
to get under way.







































































Mexico Imports U.S. Recession
but Shows Financial Strength
The National Bureau of Economic Research
tells us that after a decade-long expansion, the U.S.
economy peaked and fell into recession beginning
March 2001. Mexico has similarly slipped into re-
cession: Its index of coincident economic activity
peaked in August and September 2000; a global
index of economic activity in Mexico peaked in
October 2000; gross domestic product fell 1.6 per-
cent between fourth quarter 2000 and fourth quar-
ter 2001; and employment declined by 382,000
jobs over the same four quarters. The recession is a
U.S. import, with the U.S. manufacturing downturn
having particularly serious implications for Mexi-
can industrial production, especially the important
maquiladora operations centered in the north.
However, good news comes with the bad.
Mexico shows no signs of slipping into a financial
crisis such as those that accompanied the coun-
try’s other four economic downturns during the
past 30 years. In place of a peso crisis, this down-
turn has so far been marked by a strong peso,
declining inflation and falling interest rates. This
article examines the sources of Mexico’s recession
and the broader improvements in Mexico’s finan-
cial health that have limited the downturn’s dam-
age to that of a garden-variety recession.
MEXICAN EXPORTS
Mexico’s decision to join the North American
Free Trade Agreement was essentially a commit-
ment to integrate its economy into the larger
North American economy, which the United States
dominates by producing five times the output 
of Canada and Mexico combined. As a regional
economy, Mexico would compare with the largest
U.S. states; its total gross product fits in at the top
of the list between New York and California.Mexico produced 1.8 million barrels per day 
in 2001 and has exported just over half of its 
production in recent years. Volatility in world oil
prices imparts instability to both the Mexican
federal budget and the balance of payments.
Pemex, as national oil company and sole do-
mestic producer, turns all profit over to the
government. In 1996, for example, crude oil
contributed 28.8 percent of the federal budget,
but with the 1999 plunge in prices, Pemex
crude contributed only 14.5 percent. Last year,
as the price of Mexican crude fell to $18.53 
per barrel from $24.36 in 2000, a series of bud-
get cuts became necessary. This year, the fed-
eral budget assumes $15.50 per barrel and
includes a production cut of 100,000 barrels
per day to support the OPEC price target.   
Manufactured Goods. In the 1980s, oil was
the dominant export from Mexico, and oil reve-
nues crowded out other activity. In the 1990s,
manufacturing pushed oil aside and took the
dominant position. The maquiladora export plat-
form was a major source of this growth. Parts
are designed and produced abroad but assem-
bled in Mexico. Table 1 shows that, allowing
for the import and re-export of foreign-made
parts, the dollar earnings from manufacturing
in 2001 were at least six times that of oil. More
than 95 percent of Mexico’s non-oil exports are
now manufactured goods. 
The growing role of manufacturing is a
product of the increasing integration of Mexico
into the U.S. economy. Certainly, the major
market for these goods is the United States,
which bought 87 percent of Mexican manufac-
tured exports in 2001. The worst-hit part of the
U.S. economy in the current recession has been
manufacturing. Figure 1 overlays the growth
rate of manufacturing output in the United
States and Mexico since 1996, showing that the
timing and depth of the decline in 2000–01 are
strikingly similar in both countries.
FINANCIAL STABILITY
The regional economist has only part of the
story, however. Mexico is a sovereign nation
with its own financial system and monetary and
fiscal policy. Since 1975, economic reverses in
Mexico have been associated with serious
financial setbacks. In 1975–76, Mexico experi-
mented with a series of left-leaning policies
that included state control of investment in stra-
tegic industries and large increases in social
spending. State deficits, largely financed abroad,
If asked to assess the health of Mexico, a
regional economist might first ask what it
exports. Exports are important because they
pay for imports and because they support in-
herently local activity in food stores or laun-
dries, for example. Table 1 lists Mexico’s major
sources of dollar earnings in the current account
for the first three quarters of 2001 and com-
pares them with previous years. Recent events
in the United States have negatively affected all
four areas. 
Tourism. Tourist visits to Mexico are a com-
bination of border crossings and visits to the in-
terior. Trips across the border dominate in
numbers, but higher spending in the interior
($549 per interior visit vs. $25 on the border)
means overall revenue divides about equally
between the two. Eighty-five percent of all vis-
itors are from the United States, meaning the
slowdown in U.S. consumer spending has had
an immediate impact in Mexico. The effects of
Sept. 11, including the cutback in traffic across
the border, were felt immediately in border cities,
and numerous tourism-related layoffs have taken
place in resorts along the Pacific Coast.
Family Remittances. These are funds sent
home by an estimated 23 million Mexican citi-
zens working in the United States, legally or
illegally. About 1.3 million Mexican homes
receive this money, and it makes up about 2
percent of Mexican income. Some of the
money received is saved for a new home, a
major goal of many immigrants, but most is for
immediate consumption. The deteriorating U.S.
labor market, particularly since Sept. 11, has
slowed the flow of funds. The Inter-American
Development Bank polled 1,000 immigrants in
November and found that 7 percent had lost
jobs since Sept. 11 and 56 percent were send-
ing less money home. 
Oil. Even world oil markets are affected by
U.S. recession, as the United States has been the
chief engine of world growth for the past decade.
Table 1
Major Sources of Mexico’s Dollar Earnings
(Billions of dollars, January through September each year)
1999 2000 2001
Tourism 5.5 6.2 6.5
Family remittances 4.3 4.8 6.6
Oil 6.6 12.5 10.2
Manufactured goods 88.9 106.0 105.8
Less maquila imports 52.6 61.3 63.2
SOURCE: Banco de México.(Continued on back page)
ballooned out of control, and the peso was de-
valued for the first time since 1954.
Problems arose again in the 1980s, when
Mexico spent oil revenues from newly discov-
ered fields and borrowed heavily abroad
against future revenues. As oil prices fell, first in
1982–83 and then again in 1985–86, Mexico
found itself again unable to handle domestic
spending deficits and foreign debt, provoking
two rounds of crisis. In 1994–95, a planned de-
valuation spun out of control, and a shortage
of foreign reserves, combined with the short-
term structure of debt held abroad, forced
Mexico to float the peso. Recession in each
case was accompanied by devaluation, soaring
inflation and spiraling interest rates. A common
element in each crisis was a bankrupt banking
system—the heart of the Mexican financial sys-
tem.  
This time, things have been different. Figure
2 shows the 12-month change in the value of
the dollar relative to the peso. Measured over
24-month periods of financial crisis in 1982–83,
1986–87 and 1994–96, the dollar doubled and
tripled in value against the peso. The bottom
line on the chart, however, represents the most
recent 24 months, showing stability in the ex-
change rate. Similar charts depicting past bouts
of inflation and soaring interest rates also show
stability or improvement in recent months. 
Peso Exchange Rate. In 2001, the dollar
continued to gain in value against nearly all
world currencies; the Mexican peso was one of
only three currencies to gain against the dollar.
Peso strength stems from U.S. interest rate cuts,
financial discipline by both the Mexican central
bank and the federal government, a war chest of
over $40 billion in foreign exchange reserves
and a surge in direct foreign investment in
2001. There were few signs of contagion in
Mexico from economic crises in Turkey and
Argentina, and Mexico may have actually found
itself acting as a safe haven for funds fleeing
problems in South America.  
Inflation. Inflation fell steadily throughout
2001, with 12-month changes in consumer in-
flation dropping from 8.1 percent in January to
4.4 percent in December. The December figure
was the lowest recorded over any 12 months in
the 40 years Mexico has kept price statistics.
Inflation is the Bank of Mexico’s chief policy
target, but no doubt recessions at home and
abroad have made it easier to achieve and
exceed monetary goals.  
Interest Rates. Interest rates also declined
steadily throughout 2001. Nominal rates on 
28-day bills fell from 17.9 percent in January to
6.3 percent by December, while real rates fell
from 9.8 percent to 0.9 percent. Why such a
sharp fall? The United States was cutting rates
throughout the year, the recession limited de-
mand for credit and Mexico enjoyed larger
capital inflows in 2001 than in 2000. 
These favorable statistics are the result of long-
term structural changes as well as recent policy
decisions. High on the list of improvements
made in the past two years is the banking system,
which scored substantial gains whether meas-
ured by asset quality, profitability or capital
adequacy. Foreign control of the banking system
Figure 1
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Figure 2
Change in the Dollar–Peso Exchange Rate:
12-Month Change in Times of Crisis
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SOURCES: Adapted from a September 2001 presentation on the Banco de México 
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Layoffs at Continental Airlines, the pro-
posed Compaq merger and the Enron bank-
ruptcy have combined to hurt consumer and
business confidence in Houston. Add serious
emerging problems in the oil patch, and the
near-term outlook for Houston has turned
increasingly negative. Job growth in the fourth
quarter declined at a 1.4 percent annual rate.  
OIL AND NATURAL GAS
OPEC announced a production cut of 
1.5 million barrels per day in early January,
coordinated with a cut of another half million
from non-OPEC producers. This was sufficient
to push crude prices back up to near $20 per
barrel, where the price has stayed. Despite
stability in the price of crude, downward pres-
sure has continued to mount with warm
weather and weak global industrial demand.
U.S. inventories are 33 percent above year-
earlier levels.    
Warm weather has also limited demand
for natural gas and left inventories 76 percent
higher than last year at this time. As the
chance of a late winter storm passes, gas will
leave storage because companies don’t want
to hold it over the summer. A near-term col-
lapse of gas prices becomes increasingly pos-
sible as warm winter weather continues.  
OIL SERVICES AND MACHINERY 
U.S. drilling activity showed signs of bot-
toming out at near 850 working rigs in Janu-
ary, then quickly dropped another 38 rigs in
two weeks as warm weather increased pes-
simism about natural gas prices. A collapse 
in gas prices would quickly take another
100–150 rigs out of service. Producers, watch-
ing oil and gas inventories, have turned cau-
tious in recent weeks, canceling or postponing
near-term projects both at home and abroad. 
REAL ESTATE
With the completion of four new office
buildings, downtown office space was already
facing the possibility of being overbuilt. Enron’s
implosion, the Chevron/Texaco merger and the
new buildings are likely to take effective down-
town occupancy rates from 93 percent to the
upper 70 percent range by the end of next
year. Rents seem likely to fall several dollars
per square foot.
A strong apartment market lost momen-
tum in the fourth quarter. Occupancy remains
strong, but absorption slowed by 60 percent
from the same period a year earlier. Class A
absorption came to a standstill.
has reached 75 percent of assets, but this new
foreign capital has reversed the shrinkage of
bank assets and kick-started lending, which
has begun to grow again in just the past few
quarters. 
Government spending and budget deficits
also remain under control. Federal spending was
cut three times in 2001 as oil prices fell. The
forecast for 2002 revenues was cut again by
$2.2 billion in December as the oil price out-
look weakened. For 2002, the current adminis-
tration had hoped to broadly reform federal
taxes, broadening the value-added tax. Instead,
it received from Congress a package of miscella-
neous taxes to fill the budget gap. Still, the
2002 federal deficit outlook is only 0.65 per-
cent of GDP, small enough to keep interna-
tional investors content.  
Finally, Mexico has assembled international
reserves of $42 billion, substantially higher than
the $12 billion it held as the 1994–95 crisis un-
folded. Plus, the government has been able to
extend the yield curve in recent years, selling
public debt with maturities of three, five and 10
years. Only 27 percent of government debt ($23
billion) has a maturity of less than one year,
and only 6.5 percent of all debt is held abroad. 
So far, recovery and stronger growth in
Mexico seem to be simply a matter of waiting
for U.S. economic expansion to get under way.
The potential for crisis seems remote. The con-
sensus outlook for Mexico in 2002 is for GDP
growth under 2 percent and, as the recovery
takes hold, modest difficulty in maintaining
current low interest rates and inflation.
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